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Abstract
In several recent decisions, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit has established that a patentee's express words, as
disclosed in the specification, may be read into the claims to limit the
scope of the invention. In addition, the Federal Circuit in Scimed and
Bell Atlantic has held that not only may a patentee explicitly limit a
claim term in the specification, but she may also do so "by
implication." Thus, a specification may inherently limit the scope of a
claimed invention constituting what the author calls the "inherent
limitations doctrine." This new wrinkle in claim interpretation will
likely produce a wave of confusion for future litigants and judges.
This Comment proposes that if the Federal Circuit does apply the
inherent limitations doctrine at all, the court should do so
prospectively. This Comment also proposes a set of factors the court
can use to determine where to apply the doctrine.
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THE INHERENT LIMITATIONS DOCTRINE: How THE SPECIFICATION
MAY INHERENTLY LIMIT THE SCOPE OF THE CLAIMS
ADAM G. KELLY*
[Alice] ran across the field after [the rabbit], and was just in time to see it
pop down a large rabbit-hole under the hedge. In another moment down
went Alice after it, never once considering how in the world she was to get
out again.1

INTRODUCTION

Claim interpretation is difficult. Claim interpretation can even prove to be a
rabbit hole, which many may enter, like Alice, without realizing "how in the world
[they will] get out again."2 Judges must carefully construe claim limitations by
reading claims in light of a patent's specification, while avoiding reading in
limitations from the specification. On the other side of the bench, litigants must craft
proposed claim constructions using the facts of their respective cases together with
the claim construction jurisprudence, where patentees typically fashion broad
constructions, and accused infringers shape narrow ones.
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
established in several decisions, essentially, that the express words of the patentee,
as disclosed in the specification, may be read into the claims. In other words, the
explicit language in the specification of the patentee himself limits the scope of the
invention, and thereby, the judges are permitted to read in any limitations.
However, the Federal Circuit in Scimed Life Systems, Inc. v. Advanced
Cardiovascular Systems, Inc.3 and Bell Atlantic Network Services v. Covad
Communications Group, Inc.,4 clouded the claim construction picture by holding that
not only may a patentee explicitly define a claim term in the specification, but she
may also do so "by implication." Put another way, a specification may inherently
limit the scope of a claimed invention constituting what the author calls the
"inherent limitations doctrine." This new wrinkle in claim interpretation will likely
produce a wave of confusion for future litigants and judges.
This Comment discusses the inherent limitations doctrine, and issues arising
from the Federal Circuit's application of the doctrine. Part I gives an overview of
claim construction. Part II examines cases in which the Federal Circuit uses a
patent specification to limit the patent's claims. Part I.A discusses cases where
there are express limitations in the specification, while Part JI.B analyzes the
* J.D. Candidate, January 2002. The author thanks Professor Janice M. Mueller who
encouraged him to address this subject matter and the John Marshall Review of Intellectual
Property Law who kindly edited this article, especially Ted L. Field. The author dedicates this
article to Mrs. Winifred C. Barton, his grandmother, for her fervent love for literature. Any
mistakes in this article are his own.
'LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND 8 (Donald J. Gray ed., W.H. Norton 1992) (1897).
2 Id.

3 242 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
4262 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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situation in which the Federal Circuit holds that the specification inherently limits,
or defines by implication, claim terms. Finally, Part III considers the problems that
arise where the Federal Circuit applies the inherent limitations doctrine, as well as
solutions to these problems. Part III.A suggests that the inherent limitations
doctrine creates more problems than it is worth. Part JJJ.B proposes solutions to
these problems. These solutions include applying the inherent limitations doctrine
prospectively, if at all, as well as a set of factors the court can use to determine where
to apply the doctrine.
A patent infringement analysis entails two steps. The first step is determining
the meaning and scope of the patent claims asserted to be infringed. 5 The second
6
step is comparing the properly construed claims to the device accused of infringing.
It is the first step, commonly referred to as claim construction, 7 that is the lynchpin
of many patent disputes. Tactically, by removing this lynchpin, a party's entire case
may fold, and likewise, maintaining this fixture may carry the day. Therefore, an
explanation of claim construction is necessary.

I. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
This Part gives an overview of claim construction.
The Federal Circuit
approaches claim construction as a matter of law, and accordingly, reviews such
decisions de novo without any deference to the district court.8 To ascertain the
meaning and scope of the claims, all courts consider three primary sources that make
up intrinsic evidence: the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. 9
Courts may also employ extrinsic evidence as a fourth source. 10 In sum, courts
evaluate all four sources as they would be understood by persons of ordinary skill in
the field of the invention.11
It is well settled in patent law that courts should look first to the intrinsic
evidence of record to interpret claims. 12 "Such ... evidence is the most significant
source of the legally operative meaning of disputed claim language. .

.

. In most

situations, an analysis of the intrinsic evidence alone will resolve any ambiguity in a
13
disputed claim term."

, Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc); Read Corp. v.
Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 821 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
GId.
7 In patent law, claim construction is one and the same thing as claim interpretation.
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd, 517 U.S. 370
(1996).
8 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376-91 (1996).
One of the main
reasons that judges, rather than juries, are to construe patent claims is that they will provide
uniform definition of the scope of the legally protected monopoly. Id.
Markman, 52 F.3d at 979; Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1561 (Fed. Cir.
1991); see also Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396-98 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
10 See Fonar Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 821 F.2d 627, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (explaining that
extrinsic evidence may be expert testimony evidence of how those skilled in the art would interpret
the claims).
11Cultor Corp. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 224 F.3d 1328, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
12Markman, 52 F.3d at 979.
'3 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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Within this intrinsic sphere, courts begin with the claim language itself, both
asserted and nonasserted, to define the scope of the patented invention. 14 The
central functions of patent claims are to define the invention and to notify the public
of the patent's scope. 15 As a starting point, courts give claim terms their ordinary
and accustomed meaning to one of ordinary skill in the art.1 6 It follows that a
technical term used in a patent is interpreted as having the meaning a person of
ordinary skill in the field of the invention would understand it to mean.1 7 Courts
may also look to other terms within the same claim to construe a term's meaning, but
18
simply because a term may be construed broadly does not mean the inquiry ends.
One must examine the term's meaning further because many words are not broad
and general terms when standing in isolation.1 9 Such words may have several
meanings, each of which could prevail based on the context. 20 To resolve this
dilemma, one must next turn to the specification.
22
2
Claims must be read in view of the specification of which they are a part.
The specification contains a written description of the invention that must enable one
of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the invention.23 One purpose for
examining the specification is to determine whether the patentee has limited the
scope of the claims. 24 It is the specification that may act as a sort of dictionary, which
explains the invention and may define terms used in the claims. 25 Portions of the
specification that may explain the invention are the abstract, the summary of the
invention, and the written description, along with the objects of the invention, figures
and any other information. As the court explained in Vitronics: "[Tihe specification
is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis.
Usually, it is
14Id.
15WarnerJenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 30-31 (1997).
16Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int'l, Inc., 222 F.3d 951, 955 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
17 Bell Ati. Network Servs. v. Covad Communications Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (citing Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir.
2001)).
' See Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' Per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
19 Id.
20
21

Id.
Historians have noted that the patent specification itself, though a relatively new

development, represents the key to the patent. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S.
370, 379 (1996) (citing H. DUTTON, THE PATENT SYSTEM AND INVENTIVE ACTIVITY DURING THE
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, 1750-1852, at 75-76 (1984)).
Modern claim construction during the
nineteenth century in novelty actions was the construction of the specifications to determine
whether "any essential part of [the patent had been] disclosed to the public before." Id. (citing
Huddart v. Grimshaw, Dav. Pat. Cas. 265, 298 (K.B. 1803)). Today, however, the claims are
interpreted to determine the scope and meaning of the invention.
Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
22 Markman, 52 F.3d at 979-80; see also United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 49 (1966)
(reasoning that "claims are to be construed in light of the specifications and both are to be read with
a view to ascertaining the invention"); Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 810 F.2d 1113, 1116
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (explaining that "claims are not interpreted in a vacuum, but are part of and are
read in light of the specification").
23 Markman, 52 F.3d at 979.
24 Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 882 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
25 See In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 441 (C.C.P.A. 1970) ("Occasionally the disclosure will serve as
a dictionary for terms appearing in the claims, and in such instances the disclosure may be used in
interpreting the coverage of the claims.").
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dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term." 26 The

claims are technically part of the specification, 27 and accordingly, it plays an
important role in determining the meaning of the claim language. The Supreme
Court in United States v. AdamS 8 echoed the specification's role, stating that "while
the claims . . .limit the invention, and the specification cannot be utilized to expand
the patent monopoly .... claims are to be construed in the light of the specification

and both are to be read with a view to ascertaining the invention."29 The Federal
30
Circuit explained in an en banc decision, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
the importance of the specification when interpreting the claims:
Claims must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a
part.... The specification contains a written description of the invention
that must enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the
invention. For claim construction purposes, the description may act as a
sort of dictionary, which explains the invention and may define terms used
in the claims .... As we have often stated, a patentee is free to be his own

lexicographer .... The caveat is that any special definition given to a word
must be clearly defined in the specification ....

The written description

part of the specification itself does not 31
delimit the right to exclude. That is
the function and purpose of the claims.
Generally, there is a "heavy presumption" in favor of the ordinary or customary
meaning of claim language as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. 32 To
overcome this presumption, a patentee is at liberty to be her own lexicographer,
where she may craft terms having other than their ordinary meanings, 33 or where a
claim term deprives the claim of clarity such that there is "no means by which the
scope of the claim may be ascertained from the language used."34 To address either

situation, one must examine the specification. The caveat where the patentee acts as
her own lexicographer is that any special definition given to a word must be clearly
defined in the specification. 35 In other words, when redefining the meaning of a
particular term away from the ordinary meaning, the intrinsic evidence must "clearly
set forth" or "clearly redefine" a claim term so as to put one reasonably skilled in the
art on notice that the patentee intended to so redefine the claim term. 36 However,

27

Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Sjolund v. Musland, 847 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

28

383 U.S. 39 (1966).

26

Id.at 48-49.
'052 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en bane), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
'31
Id. at 979.
32 Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
33Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
' Johnson Worldwide, 175 F.3d at 990.
35 Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1388 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see Multiform
Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (cautioning against the use of
non-scientific dictionaries "lest dictionary definitions ... be converted into technical terms of art
having legal, not linguistic significance").
36Elekta Instrument S.A. v. O.U.R. Scientific Int'l, Inc., 214 F.3d 1302, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
aceordN. Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Ltd., 215 F.3d 1281, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (explaining that
in a best mode analysis a different meaning must be "clearly set forth in the specification"); see also
Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that "without an express
intent to impart a novel meaning to claim terms, an inventor's claim terms take on their ordinary
29
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recently the Federal Circuit extended this concept one step further, reasoning that "a
37
claim term may be clearly redefined without an explicit statement or redefinition."
Also, a specification may not "be used to vary the claim terms from how they are
defined, even implicitly." 38

Therefore,

the court now allows a specification to

39
inherently limit asserted claim language.
As to the third source of intrinsic evidence, claims should also be construed in
view of the prosecution history, if it is in evidence. 40 This "undisputed public record"
of complete proceedings in the Patent and Trademark Office is of primary
significance in claim construction. 41 Accordingly, the prosecution history is also
considered part of the patent. 42 Courts examine the prosecution history to determine
whether the patentee has relinquished a potential claim construction in an
43
amendment to the claim or in an argument to overcome or distinguish a reference.
Often times, statements made during prosecution modify a term's ordinary
meaning. 44 Indeed, the prosecution history can and should be used to construe the
claim language, but it cannot "enlarge, diminish, or vary" the limitations in the

claims.

45

meaning"); Optical Disc Corp. v. Del Mar Avionics, 208 F.3d 1324, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (reasoning
that the specification must exhibit an "express intent to impart a novel meaning" to claim terms).
'37Bell Atl. Network Servs. v. Covad Communications Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1268 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).
38 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584-85 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
-3 See Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (explaining that in order for
a disclosure to be inherent .. .one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize such a disclosure").
See generally Continental Can Co. USA, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1269-70 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (citing In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581 (C.C.P.A. 1981)) (addressing inherency in anticipation
analysis). The court reasoned that:
[I]nherency ... may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact
that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient. If,
however, the disclosure is sufficient to show that the natural result flowing from the
operation as taught would result in the performance of the questioned function, it seems
to be well settled that the disclosure should be regarded as sufficient.

Id.
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 33 (1966).
41Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed.Cir. 1995), ffrd,
517 U.S.
370 (1996).
42 Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
3 Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1 See TurboCare Div. of Demag Delaval Turbomachinery Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 264 F.3d
1111, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (reasoning that patentee represented to the public in clear and definite
terms that invention did not require a particular feature); Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 88384 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (reasoning that remarks made during prosecution, distinguishing the primary
reference from the invention, limited the claim); Hockerson-Halbertstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int'l,
Inc., 222 F.3d 951, 957 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (explaining that the public's reliance on a statement in the
prosecution history helps form their business strategies); see also CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Tura
LP, 112 F.3d 1146, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (explaining that statements made during prosecution
commit the inventor to a particular meaning of a claim term that is binding during litigation);
Southwall Techs., 54 F.3d at 1576 (reasoning that "prosecution history limits the interpretation of
claim terms so as to exclude any interpretation that was disclaimed during prosecution"; Biodex
Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 862-63 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (explaining that prosecution
history can be used to construe a claim, but it is distinct from prosecution history estoppel, which is
used to limit the expansion of the doctrine of equivalents).
,Markman, 52 F.3d at 980 (citing Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Davis, 102 U.S. 222, 227
(1880)).
40
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Finally, while some courts determine that intrinsic evidence alone will resolve
any ambiguity in a disputed claim term, 46 other courts may need additional sources
or extrinsic evidence. 47 Extrinsic evidence usually consists of all evidence external to
the patent and prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony,
dictionaries, prior art and learned treaties. 48 Generally, if the meaning of the claim
limitation is apparent from the intrinsic evidence by itself, it is improper to rely on
extrinsic evidence other than that used to ascertain the ordinary meaning of the
claim limitation. 49 Where courts do employ extrinsic evidence, they caution that such
evidence cannot be used to contradict or vary the claim language. 50 Instead, extrinsic
evidence should only be used to aid courts as to the proper understanding of these
51
claims.

II.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT DECISIONS: CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THE
COURT USES THE SPECIFICATION TO LIMIT CLAIMS

This Part examines cases in which the Federal Circuit uses a patent
specification to limit a patent's claims. Part II.A discusses cases where there are
express limitations in the specification. These cases include circumstances in which:
(1) the specification clearly indicates that the invention does not include a particular
feature; (2) the specification describes only one system or embodiment; and (3) the
specification expressly disclaims other prior art references. Part II.B analyzes the
situation in which the Federal Circuit holds that the specification inherently limits,
or defines by implication, claim terms.
It has long been recognized in patent law, in the form of two opposing canons of
claim construction, that there is a fine line between reading a claim in light of the
specification and reading a limitation into the claim from the specification. 52 These
two canons are at the core of claim construction methodology, providing "guideposts
for a spectrum of claim construction problems." 53 Bearing in mind this delicate
balance, the Federal Circuit has recently established a trend of narrowly construing
claim limitations as defined, either explicitly or implicitly, in the specification. Put
416
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating that in
most situations where the intrinsic evidence alone is enough to determine the scope and meaning of
the asserted claims, "it is improper to rely on extrinsic evidence").
17 DONALD S. CHISUM, 5A CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.03[2][e][i], at 127 (1998) ("The phrase
'extrinsic evidence' can have several meanings when used in regard to patent claim interpretation.").
18 Generally, dictionaries and technical treatises, as extrinsic evidence, hold a "special place"
and may sometimes be considered along with intrinsic evidence when determining the ordinary
meaning of the claim terms. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584 n.6. However, specifically in the case of
dictionaries, "definitions of common words are often less useful than the patent documents
themselves in establishing the usage of ordinary words in connection with the claimed subject
matter." Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
19 Vitronies, 90 F.3d at 1582.
5o Id. at 1583.
51Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd, 517 U.S.
370 (1996).
52 Comark Communications, Inc., v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(explaining that "there is sometimes a fine line between reading a claim in light of the specification,
and reading a limitation into the claim from the specification").
' Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' Per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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another way, the Federal Circuit will read either explicit or inherent limitations from
the specification onto the asserted claims.

A. Express Limitations In The Specification
The Federal Circuit limits claims based upon express words in the specification.
Such instances include where an invention does not expressly include a particular
feature, where the specification describes only one system or embodiment, and where
the specification expressly disclaims other prior art references.

1. Invention Does Not Expressly Include a ParticularFeature
In certain instances the specification may make clear that the invention does not
include a particular feature. For example in Watts v. XL Systems, Inc., 54 a patentee
limited his invention by arguments made to the examiner to distinguish the primary
reference cited. 55 The 56claims at issue recited connecting sections of pipe that could be
"sealingly connected." The patentee argued that the district court erred by reading
a limitation from the specification. 57 Affirming the district court, the Watts court
found that the specification disclosed only one method to achieve the sealing
connection by employing misaligned taper angles of the threads of the connected
pipes. 58 The court reasoned that while the disputed language in isolation was not

clear on its face, the specification did not explicitly discuss an embodiment without
misaligned taper angles. 59 As for the prosecution history, the court explained that
the patentee had likewise limited his invention by the arguments he made to
distinguish a primary prior art reference. 60 In sum, the specification and the
prosecution history, in this case, actually limited the invention to embodiments with
misaligned taper angles.
In a similar situation, the Federal Circuit limited the meaning of a claim term
based on the prosecution history in TurboCare Division of Demag Delaval
Turbomachinery Corp. v. General Electric Co. 61 In that case, with respect to a
"working fluid" limitation recited in a claim for a fluid-driven turbine, the defendant
argued that the patentee disclaimed certain steam pathway configurations when he
distinguished over a prior art reference. 62 Agreeing with the defendant, the court
determined that the patentee limited his "working fluid" element when he overcame
that prior art rejection. 63 The court explained that the patentee represented to the
public in clear and definite terms that his invention did not require a particular
' 232 F.3d 877 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Id. at 883.
F Id. at 882.
57Id.
,oS
Id. at 883.

F Id. at 88283.
60 Id. at 883.

(1264 F.3d 1111 (Fed.Cir. 2001).
62Id.

at 112223.
63 Id. at 1123.
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feature, i.e., "any drilled holes above the ring."64 Therefore, the patentee limited the
65
scope of the claims based on arguments the patentee advanced during prosecution.

2. Specification Describes Only One System or Embodiment
The Federal Circuit has given narrow constructions in light of the written
description where the specification describes only one system or embodiment in at
least three cases: Modine Manufacturing Co. v. United States InternationalTrade
Commission;66 Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. America Online, Inc.;67 and Toro Co. v.
White Consolidated Industries, Inc. 68 In each of these cases the Federal Circuit
limited the patentee to only his preferred embodiment as read from the
69
specification.
In Modine Manufacturing,the court held that "when the preferred embodiment
is described in the specification as the invention itself, the claims are not necessarily
entitled to the scope broader than that embodiment." 70 Addressing the limitation
"relatively small" regarding a hydraulic diameter in an automotive air conditioner,
the court observed that the preferred embodiment, as disclosed in the specification,
described a range of "about 0.015-0.040 inch" in diameter.7 1 The court recognized
that ordinarily a claim limitation "that is claimed in general descriptive words, when
a numerical range appears in the specification and in other claims, is not limited to
the numbers in the specification or the other claims." 72 However, the court noted
that here no other range was present in the specification and, in fact, a much broader
range had been removed during prosecution.7 3 Therefore, the court determined
"relatively small" to be limited to the range as described in the preferred
74
embodiment.
In Wang Laboratories,both parties agreed that the term "frame" can, in general
usage, be applied to bit-mapped display systems as well as to character-based
systems.7 5 The issue was whether the patentee used the term "frame" in the patent
in the general sense, or whether persons of skill in that field would understand the
term as being more narrowly limited to the character-based systems described in the
(34Id.

65Id.
6 75 F.3d 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
(37 197

F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
199 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
6 Soo Electro Med. Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Scis., Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(" [A]lthough the specification] may well indicate that certain embodiments are preferred, particular
embodiments appearing in a specification will not be read into the claims when the claim language
is broader than such embodiments."). But ef Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 163 F.3d 1342, 1348
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (explaining that "mere repetition in the written description of a preferred aspect of a
claimed invention does not limit the scope of an invention that is described in the claims in different
and broader terms").
70 Modine Mfg., 75 F.3d at 1551.
71Id.
72 Jd
73 Id.
7 Id. at 1551-52.
7 Wang Labs., 197 F.3d at 1381.
68
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patent regarding online information systems. 76 The court found the latter. 77 The
court noted that the only system "described and enabled" in the specification and
drawings used a character-based protocol.78 The court further explained that "the
only preferred embodiment described in the [patent] specification is the character79
based protocol."
Another example where the court limited the claims to only the preferred
embodiment is Tero.80 In that case the patent described and claimed a hand-held
convertible vacuum-blower for blowing yard debris.8 1 According to the claims, the
cover was fitted with a ring that restricted the size of the air inlet when the device
was being used to blow debris. 8

2

The claim at issue characterized the cover as

"including" a restriction ring.8 3 Before the court was the question whether the cover
had to be permanently attached to the restriction ring.84 The court noted that the
specification described the restriction ring as "built ...as part of the air inlet cover"
and did not suggest that "the cover and the ring may be two distinct components to
be inserted and removed separately."8 5 In fact, the court found that the specification
did not show the cover without an attached restriction ring.8 6 The court concluded
that this structure was not simply the preferred embodiment, but is was the only
embodiment.8 7 In this decision, the court followed the reasoning of Modine
88
Manufacturing,
yet did not cite it.

3. Specification Expressly Disclaims OtherPriorArt References
In some situations the Federal Circuit may limit the scope of the claims where
the specification expressly disclaims other prior art references. The consequence of
such statements is that a patentee's invention will not cover those prior art
89
inventions. Such was the case in Cultor Corp. v. A.E. Staley ManufacturingCo.,
0.1 Corp. v. Tekmar Co.,90 and Scimed Life Systems, Inc. v. Advanced
CardiovascularSystems, Inc..91
As the court recently explained in Cultor, it is not correct to construe claims "to
76 _d,
77 Id.
78

Id.

at 1382.

79 Id. at 1383. The court relied upon the general rule that where the subject matter that is
claimed is the only subject matter that is described and enabled in the specification, that is the
invention itself, and not simply a preferred embodiment of a broader invention that is not described
and enabled. Id. (citing Modine Mfg., 75 F.3d at 1551).
80 Toro, 199 F.3d at 1301.
81 Id. at 1297.

82 Id.
83

Id. at 1300.

84

Id.

85

Id. at 1301.

Id. The court also noted that the twenty-one drawings of the specification also did not show
the cover without a restriction ring attached. Id.
87 Id. at 1301.
88
Modine Mfg., 75 F.3d at 1382.
89 224 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
90 115 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
91242 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
86
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cover what was expressly disclaimed." 92 The claim language broadly recited to
"dissolving polydextrose in water. ' ' 93 The written description, however, distinguished
over the prior art the claimed polydextrose process using a citric acid catalyst. 94 The
court held that "by limiting the subject matter to that produced using a citric acid
catalyst, the inventors limited their claimed invention."95 Despite the fact the claims
themselves did not refer to citric acid, the court refused to hold that the asserted
claims read on a process using a catalyst other than citric acid. 96 The court further
reasoned that the language in the specification was a disclaimer of the other prior art
97
acids.
The analysis in O.L Corp. is also instructive. There, the patent claimed an
apparatus and method for removing water vapor from a sample to be analyzed in a
gas chromatograph. 98 The patentee argued that the district court erred by narrowing
the scope of the invention to the type of "passage" used in the preferred
embodiment. 99 The court disagreed for two reasons. 100 First, the court explained
that the specification contemplated only passages that were either non-smoothed or
conical.101 Second, the patentee expressly distinguished the invention over the prior
10 2
art passages by maintaining that the prior art passages were smooth-walled.
Therefore, the court reasoned that one skilled in the art would read those statements
in the specification and "conclude that the invention does not encompass smooth'1 0 3
walled, completely cylindrical structures."
In Scimed, the Federal Circuit followed the reasoning of both 0.1 Corp. and
Cultor in holding a patentee to a narrowed scope of his balloon dilation catheter
invention based on statements in the specification.10 4 The court noted that at various
instances in the specification, the claimed invention used coaxial, rather than sideby-side lumens.10 5 The court considered this finding an "inescapable conclusion" that
the references in the specification narrowed the scope of the claims. 10 6 For example,
the court pointed out that the abstract identified the inflation lumen as annular, or
coaxial. 107
The specification discussed disadvantages of prior art dual-lumen
configurations, while highlighting the advantages of coaxial lumen catheters. 10 8 In
Cultor, 224 F.3d at 1331.
93 -d.at 1330.
91Id. at 1331.
92

9 Id.
96 Id.

97Id.
98 0. Corp., 115 F.3d at 1578.
99Id. at 1581.
100

Id.

101

Id.

102

Id.

103 Id.; see Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1159-60 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (explaining that one

of ordinary skill in the art would know that nothing in the specification suggests that shapes other
than conical are a part of the disclosure, and therefore, the claims are not entitled to an earlier filing
date in a written description dispute).
104 Scimed, 242 F.3d at 1345-46.
10N Id. at 1342. In other words, the guide wire lumen is contained within the inflation lumen
and that the inflation lumen is annular. Id.
106Id.
107Id.
1o

Id. at 1342-43.
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other examples, the summary of the invention and conclusion portions of the patent
disclosed the "present invention" having references to an "annular inflation
lumen." 10 9 Moreover, the court found most compelling that in the "Catheter
Intermediate Sleeve Section," the inflation lumen was described as annular in
configuration. 110 The court reasoned that "it is difficult to imagine how the patents
could have been clearer in making the point that the coaxial lumen configuration was
'
a necessary element of every variant of the claimed invention."1 11
Explaining
further, the court noted that "the written description can provide guidance as to the
meaning of the claims, thereby dictating the manner in which the claims are to be
11 2
construed, even if the guidance is not provided in explicit definitional format."
Therefore, Scimed suggests that a specification may not only expressly restrict, but
may inherently limit, the scope of the claims of an invention.

B. Specification Inherently Limits, or Defines by Implication, Claim Terms
This Part analyzes the situation in which the Federal Circuit holds that the
specification inherently limits, or defines by implication, claim terms. The Federal
Circuit very recently carved a new, irregular niche in the claim construction
methodology when it decided Bell Atlantic Network Systems, Inc. v. Covad
Communications Group, Inc.113 This case holds, essentially, that the specification
may inherently limit the claims.
In Bell Atlantic, the court held that a patentee may limit the scope of her
invention by defining claimed terms in the specification "by implication."11 4 This new
distinction in claim interpretation may prove to be a rabbit hole11 5 for some litigants
to avoid.
The patent at issue in Bell Atlantic concerned data transmission systems that
can be used to provide DSL11 6 services with variable rates and modes without
replacing the underlying hardware and equipment.11 7 The first dispute centered
around a claimed first and second "transceiver."'1 18 The issue was whether the
"plurality of different modes" in which the transceiver operated included either the
three modes described in the specification or additional modes not explicitly stated in
109 Id. at 1343.

110 Id.
111 Id. at 1344.

112 Id. (citing Phonometrics, Inc. v. N. Telecom Inc., 133 F.3d 1459, 1466 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Gen.

Am. Transp. Corp. v. Cryo-Trans, Inc., 93 F.3d 766, 769"70 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Carroll Touch, Inc. v.

Electro Mech. Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson

& Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1566-67 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
11,3
262 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
114

BellAti., 262 F.3d at 1269-72.

11,
See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (discussing the "rabbit hole"); ef Autogiro Co. of
Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967) ("The Alice-in-Wonderland view that
something means whatever one chooses it to mean makes for enjoyable reading, but bad law.").
116

DSL stands for "direct service line." Be]] At., 262 F.3d at 1263 (explaining that "DSL

technology enables high-speed transmission over common copper telephone wiring by exploiting the
unused, higher frequencies over twisted pairs wires").
117Id. at 1263-64.
118
Id.at 1266.
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the written description. 119 The patentee argued that the universe of "modes"
contemplated by the patent was not limited to the three modes discussed in the
specification. 120 The patentee reasoned that those three modes were "three broad
categories" that may embrace other operational "modes." 121 The patentee also noted
that each mode could be changed by altering the rate of data transfer within each
broad category. 122 In other words, the patentee sought to show that "a plurality of
123
different modes" also included methods of altering the transmission rates.
The court, however, disagreed. 124 The court stated that it "may be true that the
ordinary meaning of the word 'mode' supports a broader meaning than the
construction ascertained by the district court." 125 Recognizing that a patentee is free
"to act as his own lexicographer by using the specification to define terms either
expressly or by implication," the court employed the specification for support. 126 The
court noted that the patentee consistently used the terms "mode" and "rate" as
separate and distinct concepts throughout the specification. 127
Due to this
distinction, "different 'modes' cannot be created by varying the date rate within one
of the three broad categories." 128 In addition, the court reasoned that "this case does
not involve the varied use of a disputed term." 129 "[instead, the patentees defined

the term 'mode' by implication, through the term's consistent use throughout [the
patent] specification." 130 The court further explained that "when a patentee uses a
claim term throughout the entire patent specification, in a manner consistent with
' 131
only a single meaning, he has defined that term 'by implication."'
Therefore, based
upon the facts of this case, the Federal Circuit held that the specification inherently
limited the claims. 132 This holding, that there is an inherent limitations doctrine,
gives rise to several serious problems.

I1.

PROBLEMS WITH THE INHERENT LIMITATIONS DOCTRINE: THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
133
SHOULD TREAD CAREFULLY INTO THE RABBIT HOLE

This Part considers the problems that arise where the Federal Circuit applies
the inherent limitations doctrine, as well as solutions to these problems. Part III.A
119 Id. at 1269.
(discussing the modes in the specification as conventional, bi-directional, and reversible).

120 Id.
121 Id.
122

Id.

123 Id.
124 Id. at
125 Id. at
126

1270.
1269-70.

Id.

127Id. at
128 Id. at
129 Id. at

1270.
1272.
1273.
1,30
Id. According to the BellAtlantie court, Johnson Worldwide stands for the proposition that
the varied use of terms throughout specification does not limit claims. Id. at 1270 (citing Johnson
Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 991 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
1,31
Id. at 1271 (emphasis added); see Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (explaining that prior art may not be used to vary claim terms from how they are
defined, even implicitly, in the specification or file history).
132 BeflAtI., 262 F.3d at 1271.
133

See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (discussing the "rabbit hole").
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suggests that the inherent limitations doctrine creates more problems than it is
worth. Part 111.13 proposes solutions to these problems. One solution is that the
Federal Circuit should apply the inherent limitations doctrine prospectively, if at all.
Another possible solution is for the Federal Circuit to develop a set of factors that
courts can use to determine what situations in which to apply the inherent
limitations doctrine.

A. The Inherent LimitationsDoctrine CreatesMore Problems than It Is Worth.
The recent scholarly holdings in Scimed and Bell Atlantic, providing for a
definition "by implication" scheme or inherent limitations doctrine certainly create
practical problems. 134 The inherent limitations doctrine is simply a tool for accused
infringers to escape infringement.
The doctrine also adversely affects patent
attorneys in several facets of their daily practice. Furthermore, the doctrine fails to
provide district court judges with a uniform and certain standard for claim
interpretation. Moreover, the doctrine unsuccessfully ameliorates the public notice
function of claims. Finally, the inherent limitations doctrine fails to encourage
135
innovation and does not stimulate the economy.

1. The InherentLimitations DoctrineIs Simply a Tool for Defendants to Escape
Infringement.
The inherent limitations doctrine especially serves an accused infringer. Under
the doctrine, an alleged infringing defendant may now fashion narrower claim
constructions during Markman proceedings based on inherent limitations, as he may
concoct from the specification. So long as the accused infringer crafts a patent term's
construction, which possibly appears consistent throughout the specification, a court
will now likely adopt her representation. For such defendants to receive their
espoused claim constructions after a Markman proceeding often means resolution of
the entire lawsuit. This resolution typically arises from either adjudication or
settlement. Notwithstanding the fact that accused infringers already possess express
limitations case law in their litigation tool bag, as explained in Scimed, now
defendants may arm themselves with the inherent limitations shield. But the
inherent limitations doctrine has only been expressly employed in Bell Atlantic.
Whether the inherent limitations doctrine will cross over into other circumstances,
such as pioneering patents, remains to been seen.

134 Scimed stands more specifically for limiting the claims based upon expressed language in
the specification, but generally both Seimed and Bell Atlantie provide case law tools to limit claims
generally.
135 Another reason why the "by implication" scheme is faulty is that it is supported by suspect
case law. Vitronies suggests the "by implication" language using Markman for support. Vitronies,
90 F.3d at 1582 (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)). However, Markman does not use the word "implication" in the context of
claim construction, and it is completely devoid of the word "inherent." Markman, 52 F.3d at 9671026.
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2. The InherentLimitations DoctrineIs Adverse to PatentAttorneys in Several
Facets of TheirDaily Practice.
Patent attorneys now face an inherent limitations doctrine, or definition "by
implication" scheme, that hinders several roles of their practice. For instance, many
patent attorneys may find difficulty in drafting noninfringement and infringement
opinions for their clients. Not only must patent attorneys be mindful of express
language, but they must be clairvoyant and speculate whether there are any implied
limitations lurking in the specification. Attorneys cannot be expected to provide
competent, reliable opinions as to how clients should handle infringement issues if
these opinions may be rendered incorrect "by implication."
Likewise in the litigation role, patent attorneys representing patentees must be
mindful of claim construction arguments at Markman proceedings. Judges may
reject a litigant's purported claim construction under the guise of an inherent
limitation hiding in the specification.
Inherent limitations lingering in the
specification could truncate the patentee's scope and meaning of the claims, which
may not accurately reflect the true breadth of his invention. Consequently, a patent
attorney must not only play the role of client counselor and litigation attorney, but
now oracle.

3. The InherentLimitations DoctrineFails to Provide DistrictCourtJudges with a
Uniform and Certain Standardof Claim Construction.
District court judges will also confront problems with the inherent limitations
doctrine. For many district courts, Markman proceedings are not commonplace.
Therefore, the Federal Circuit must establish a workable claim construction standard
to make the task of district court judges easier. Uniformity and certainty are modern
patent law mantras firmly planted in claim construction analysis. 136 Despite this
spirit of judicial economy, judges must now decipher express technical language,
explicitly disclosed in the specification and also draw several inferences that,
collectively, may imply limitations into an invention. In essence, a bundle of
inferences will truncate the patentee's day in court. Such use of an inherent
limitations protocol will likely yield obtuse results, disfavoring the patentee and
leading to more claim construction appeals and possibly district court reversals.
A further layer of complication with which district court judges must now
grapple is whether to apply this new inherent limitations doctrine retroactively.
Suppose that Grant and Lee each file and receive a patent-Grant in 1995 and Lee in
2002. If both men were to separately file infringement suits against different parties
in 2002, which case law regarding claim construction would a district court judge
apply? Lee relied upon the inherent limitations doctrine, since his patent issued in
2002. However, it is not fair for Grant, who relied upon "old rules," to be subjected to
136 Craig Allen Nard, Symposium: Intellectual Property Challenges in the Next Century:
Process Considerations In The Age of Markman and Mantras, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 355, 356
("Uniformity and certainty are modern patent law mantras particularly as they apply to approaches
to claim interpretation and to ultimate claim meaning."). See generaly Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
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this new inherent limitations doctrine.
This problem further complicates the
inherent limitations doctrine. Simply put, due to the absence of a uniform and
certain standard for district court judges to construe claims, judicial economy is illserved.

4. The InherentLimitations Doctrine Unsuccessfully Ameliorates the Public Notice
Function.
The inherent limitations doctrine unsuccessfully ameliorates the public notice
function of patent claims. The public notice function of patent claims drives many
claim construction decisions in several recent post- Warner-Jenkinson'37 Federal
Circuit decisions.
Generally, the public record or intrinsic evidence should
unambiguously describe the scope of the patented invention. From this record,
potential infringers or competitors review such disclosures to ascertain the scope of
the patentee's claimed invention. 138 This inspection allows competitors to design
around patented inventions when necessary. In theory, after examining a patent,
competitors should be on notice of a patentee's claimed invention, either expressly or
implicitly. However, this theoretical approach fails with the inherent limitations
doctrine, where the public notice function cuts against the patentee and shields the
accused infringer. Now competitors, holding a case-law created "by implication"
license, may practice a patentee's invention and escape infringement because they
are "on notice" of each limitation. It is noteworthy that neither Scimed nor Bell
Atlantic discusses how an inherent limitation from the specification ameliorates the
public notice function. Certainly, the Federal Circuit should have addressed this
important public policy consideration. Unless the Federal Circuit corrects this
problem in a subsequent panel opinion or en banc consideration, the inherent
limitations doctrine ameliorates very little of the public notice function of patent
claims by permitting competitors to escape infringement, not a patentee's assertion of
his property rights.

"37 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 31 (1997) (explaining that
the central function of patent claims themselves are notice and definition); see Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 576 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc) ('A complete
bar therefore best serves the notice and definitional function of patent claims."), cert. granted,121 S.
Ct. 2519 (2001).
138 In Litton Systems, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., Judge Gajarsa in a dissenting opinion stated
that:
Public notice of the scope of the right to exclude, as provided by the patent claims,
specification and prosecution history, is a critical function of the entire scheme of the
patent law. The notice function is critical because it provides competitors with the
necessary information upon which they can rely to shape their behavior in the
marketplace.
145 F.3d 1472, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Gajarsa, J., dissenting from an order declining the suggestion
for rehearing en banc).
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5. The InherentLimitations DoctrineFails to EncourageInnovation and Stimulate
the Economy.
Finally, the inherent limitations doctrine thwarts innovation and provides little
assistance to the current economy. Many businesses hold out a patent as the
139
ultimate reward for investing substantial sums of money, resources and time.
Once the PTO grants a patent to a patentee, and the patentee then assigns the
patent to a business entity, the directors of the entity are free to assign or license its
protected technology. Business executives formulate short- and long-term decisions
partly based upon the strength and market power of their patents. Pursuant to this
process, innovation drives businesses to earn market power, profits, and prestige.
Yet when the inherent limitations doctrine cuts down a patent's scope, the spirit of
innovation fades. Such erosion places businesses into a precarious position: Should
a business devote substantial efforts to research only to achieve a narrow property
right, or should it roll the dice by walking the line of infringement of its competitors'
patents?
140
Congress created the Federal Circuit to create uniformity in the patent law.
Indeed, the Supreme Court recognizes this special expertise. 141 Since the Federal
Circuit is practically a court of last resort in patent law, 142 the court's impact on
particular business entities or the economy is direct. Hypothetically, if the Federal
Circuit were to narrowly construe a patent for a drug that cured cancer, the effects
on the patentees or assignees and their competitors are obvious. Competing drug
companies, would benefit from the cancer-curing technology, positioning themselves
to reap financial windfalls. 143 Conversely, the patentees or assignees would not likely
recoup their investments due to their devalued patent. Accordingly, if the Federal
Circuit were to decide to consistently restrict patent claims under the inherent
limitations doctrine, all patents would lose value, 144 not just the patentee in Bell

'39

Commentators argue that patent law focuses on the independent inventor, not business

entities.

The focus of this Comment is on business entities, so this Comment does not address

independent inventors. See generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND
RELATED STATE DOCTRINES 359 (3d ed. 1990); FLOYD L. VATGHAN, THE UNITED STATES PATENT

SYSTEM 11 (1956); Gwendolyn Dawson, Note, Matchmakingin the Realm of Patents. A Callfor the
Marriage of Patent Theory and Claim Construction Procedure, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1257, 1263-64
(2001).
140 See Festo, 234 F.3d at 572 ("Congress specifically created the Federal Circuit to resolve
issues unique to patent law.").
"I See Warner-donkinson, 520 U.S. at 41 (asserting that the Federal Circuit has sound
judgment in patent law, its area of "special expertise"); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) (acknowledging that the Federal Circuit would "strengthen the United
States patent system in such a way as to foster technological growth and industrial innovation").
142 Mark D. Janis, Symposium: IntellectualPropertyChallenges in the Next Century: Article
Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 387, 387-88 ("The
Supreme Court has rendered itself well nigh invisible in modern substantive patent law. The Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, created in 1982, has become the de facto supreme court of
patents.").
143 This cancer-curing hypothetical assumes that no other "magic bullet" cancer-curing patents
have ever been issued.
144 Markman, 517 U.S. at 390. "The public [would] be deprived of rights supposed to belong to
it, without being clearly told what it is that limits these rights." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting
Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573 (1876)).
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Atlantic. 145

B. Possible Solutions
Judges should apply the inherent limitations doctrine, or "by implication"
scheme, prospectively, if at all. 146 Because all claim construction decisions are
limited to the facts of each particular case, a blanket application of the inherent
limitations doctrine is neither likely nor practical. As Federal Circuit Judge
Newman stated for the court:
All rules of construction must be understood in terms of the factual
147
situations that produced them, and applied in fidelity to their origins.
Undoubtedly, if judges applied the doctrine woodenly, 148 they would prevent the
doctrine from taking on a life of its own. However, to apply the inherent limitations
doctrine effectively, courts should formulate a set of factors and apply them to each
set factual situation.
The author proposes three such factors: (1) the type of patent being construed;
(2) the type of technology claimed; and (3) a balance of fairness between the patentee
and the public. The first factor is the type of patent being construed. Certain types
of patents receive broader construction than others. For example, as in a doctrine of
equivalents analysis, pioneering patents should receive broader constructions
compared to patents in crowded arts. The second factor is the type of technology
claimed. Certain technologies may call for different treatment due to different levels
of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. 149 Namely, biotechnology inventions require
greater disclosure in their specifications as opposed to simple mechanical inventions.
The third factor is a balance of fairness to the patentee and the public. Judges
should construe claims to ensure appropriate fairness to patentees who invest time
and energy to obtain a patent, and to the public who rely upon the patents to promote
11, Of course, one may argue that the basic purpose of the Federal Circuit is to establish
uniform patent laws throughout the union, not respond to the ebbs and flows of the economy such as
Alan Greenspan, the present Chairman of the Federal Reserve, must do. While this may be true,
Federal Circuit jurisprudence still affects the economy, whether the court intends to do so or not.
1416Prospective application also preserves the rationale explained in SRI International v.
Matsushita Electric Corp. of America. 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc). The court
explained that one key rationale for not importing limitations from the written description into the
claims is that if everything in the specification were required to be read into the claims, or if
structural claims were to be limited to devices operated precisely as a specification-described
embodiment is operated, there would be no need for claims. Id.
117 Modine Mfg. Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
148 Cf Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 41 (1997) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) ("The new presumption, if applied woodenly, might in some instances unfairly discount
the expectations of a patentee."). The "presumption" about which Justice Ginsburg wrote is the
presumption that amendments made during the prosecution history are for patentability reasons,
and that the patentee has the burden to prove otherwise. See id. at 33-34.
119 See id. at 39-40 (addressing how equivalence is determined under the doctrine of
equivalents and explaining that "there seems to be substantial agreement that, while the triple
identity test may be suitable for analyzing mechanical devices, it often provides a poor framework
for analyzing other products or processes").
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innovation. For instance, determining a claim construction that is loosely supported
by the specification works against the public.
On the other hand, a claim
construction broadly supported in the specification, but narrowly construed by a
judge, harms the patentee by restricting scope of the claims.
Therefore, judges should apply the inherent limitations doctrine prospectively,
as the facts of each particular case dictate. In addition, judges should also adopt
factors to aid this analysis. This proposed solution will preserve the inherent
limitations doctrine while ensuring sufficient benefits to the patentee and the public.
Hence, this type of prospective application of the inherent limitations doctrine paints
150
it as "workable."

IV. CONCLUSION

Generally, courts construe an inventor's own express words, as found in the
claim language itself, the specification, and prosecution history to limit the scope of
an invention. However, the Federal Circuit recently augmented this concept by
using such words and defining claim terms "by implication." It is likely that the
holding in Bell Atlantic may ring hollow among members of the patent bar and
judges alike. This holding fails to provide litigants and judges with a clear and
practical standard for claim interpretation, and it fails to fully satisfy the public
notice function and to stimulate the economy by encouraging innovation. Judge Dyk
voiced an appropriate assessment of the state of claim construction analysis through
his concurring remarks in Scimed:
The problem is that our decisions provide inadequate guidance as to when it
is appropriate to look to the specification to narrow the claim by
interpretation and when it is not appropriate to do so. Until we [the
Federal Circuit] provide better151 guidance, I fear that the lower courts and
litigants will remain confused.
Pursuant to Judge Dyk's concerns, the most likely solution addressing this
inherent limitations doctrine is for the Federal Circuit to apply the doctrine
prospectively, if at all. Furthermore, in determining whether to apply the doctrine in
a given situation, the court should consider a set of factors. Such factors may include
the type of patent being construed, the type of technology claimed, and a balance of
fairness between the patentee and the public. Otherwise, in the future, the value of
patents will evanesce into Wonderland.152

15oC. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 575 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (en banc) (defining a "workable" rule to mean a rule that "can be relied upon to produce
consistent results and give rise to a body of law that provides guidance to the marketplace on how to
conduct its affairs"), cert. granted,121 S. Ct. 2519 (2001).
1,5
Scimed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (Dyk, J., concurring).
152

C. supranotes 1-2 and accompanying text (discussing "Wonderland").

